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ABSTRACT
There has recently been an intensifying discomfort about State 
spying on investigative journalists in South Africa. Journalists are 
harassed by what the media has now termed ‘rogue spies’. Hanton 
(2013) defines rogue spies as “trained intelligence operatives 
working outside of the usually accepted rules”. The findings show 
that investigative journalists are being spied on. Some of the 
respondents in this study say they have hard evidence to prove this, 
while others give a perspective account of their suspicions of being 
under surveillance. Findings furthermore show a growing trend of 
self-censoring among the respondents who argue that they merely 
try to protect their sources. Respondents say that even though 
surveillance of journalists is bad, it has made their journalism better 
and more responsible, as there is now no room for errors. In 
addition, findings show that there is a serious need for government 
to tighten the weak legislation and oversight on intelligence with 
regard to state security. Findings also show that the State’s effort to 
intimidate and harass whistleblowers strangles information flow from 
sources into the public domain. The study examines how 
perceptions of surveillance affect investigative journalism in South 
Africa. This study is located within the context of significant local 
investigative journalism events that deal with investigative 
journalists and their perception of surveillance.
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ensures that citizens make informed choices and serves a ‘checking 
function’.
The aim of this study is to understand how perceptions of 
surveillance affect investigative journalism in South Africa. The 
study focuses on South Africa’s investigative journalism and the 
ongoing challenges posed by government security agencies. The 
country’s history of investigative journalism is well documented and 
its tradition dates back to the 1950s.
The golden thread of investigative journalism, as observed by 
Harber and Renn (2010), dates back to the Guardian of the 1950s; 
Drum Magazine (also in the 1950s and onwards); the Rand Daily 
Mail in the 1960s and 1970s; the Sunday Express in the 1970s; 
Vrye Weekbiad in the 1980s; the Weekly Mail in the 1990s; The 
Daily Dispatch starting in the 1970s (and currently); and the Sunday 
Times from the 1960s onwards.
In his book God, Spies and Lies, author John Matisonn says that the 
three reporters who broke the story of the Muldergate Scandal (also 
known as the Information Scandal) worked for the Weekly Mail, 
Sunday Times and Sunday Express in the mid-to-late 1970s 
(Matisonn, 2015:177).
Unlike the routine journalism where journalists react to what is 
happening, investigative journalism is about reporting information 
that is not in the public domain yet. It is reporting hinged on the 
journalist’s own initiative. Essentially, investigative journalists dig up 
what is secret or hidden to provide something new.
In the course of digging up new facts, journalists often encounter 
challenges, such as being kept under surveillance by the State.
These journalists often find themselves subjected to government’s 
efforts to keep tabs on them and their sources (Harber & Renn,
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The Association for Progressive Communications (APC) and the 
Humanist Institute for Cooperation with Developing Countries 
(Hivos) (2007:225) further report that the story led to South Africa’s 
head of Police, Cele, being fired by the President in 2012 for 
dishonesty, unlawfulness and mismanagement in concluding a 
lease deal for offices for SAPS in the capital city of Pretoria and in 
Durban.
During the journalists’ investigation, the Hawks (the Directorate for 
Priority Crime Investigation) reportedly intercepted phone 
conversations of Wa Afrika. This was later confirmed by the 
Inspector-General of Intelligence (De Lange, 2011). A police officer 
has since been charged with creating false information to get 
permission from a judge to tap the phones of Wa Afrika and 
Hofstatter. Eye Witness News senior journalist, Barry Bateman, in 
an interview with Talk Radio 702 (Friedman, 2016) explained that 
the officer used false names of suspects, and that he submitted five 
suspects and seven telephone numbers on his application. By using 
those false names, he then submitted the telephone numbers of the 
journalists among them. Wa Afrika’s number was among those on 
this application.
This information confirms Duncan and Mare’s (2015) firm view that 
government agents carry out spying activities and target journalists 
who are investigating and exposing corruption.
Holcomb and Page (2015) make a case that at least two-thirds 
(64%) of investigative journalists who have been interviewed believe 
that the government of the United States of America has most likely 
put them under surveillance, while eight in ten believe that being a 
journalist increases the likelihood of their data being collected.
According to Holcomb et al. (2015:2), concerns about surveillance 
and hacking have generally fallen short of keeping most journalists
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the right to communicate to all citizens and argues that the media 
must serve the needs of all of its audience (AL-Ahmed 1987).
The research in hand explores journalists’ perceptions of the extent 
to which State Security agencies spy on their activities in South 
Africa. The primary focus is on the impact of State surveillance on 
the practice of investigative journalism in South Africa.
The researcher attempted to understand if and how journalists’ 
perceptions influence whether or not a story is investigated; the 
methods used to collect information; the measures taken to protect 
sources; how the evolving story is archived; how notes and files are 
stored to protect the journalist and his or her source; the role of 
editorial oversight; the institutional protection of journalists; and 
finally, what impact this has on how the story is written.
The current study is aimed at deconstructing the perceptions of 
journalists, and establishing the extent of spying on journalists as 
well as how it obstructs newsgathering processes.
1.2 Aim
The purpose of this study is to
• explain the perception regarding the extent of government spying 
on investigative journalists;
• establish how these acts of spying affect newsgathering 
processes;
• determine how surveillance affects journalists and how far 
journalists would go to safeguard media freedom;
• expound on how perceptions of surveillance influence the 
media's attitude towards the State.
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any specific targets and was conceived of as a 360-degree scan of 
the political horizon. It started as an independent investigation and 
resulted in unlawful interception of phone calls as well as the illegal 
surveillance of prominent business people, senior African National 
Congress members and the parliamentary office of an opposition 
party. It did not end before surveillance -  both physical and through 
telephone intercepts -  had been conducted of businesspersons, 
journalists and politicians, none of whom were ever found to have 
engaged in nefarious activities. Such spying was illegal then, and 
would be illegal today; yet it is almost certainly still taking place (De 
Wet, 2013). According to De Wet, the mandate of Project Avani was 
to gather intelligence to identify any threat that the presidential 
succession debate would pose for the impending Jacob Zuma trial 
and to determine the impact that poor service delivery might have 
on security and stability of the Republic and its people.
Matisonn (2015:199) makes a case that spying on journalists in 
South Africa dates back to the 1970s, if not beyond. He says that 
‘besides the increasingly dysfunctional atmosphere coming from the 
‘bean-counters’ and white establishment reactionaries, editors and 
journalists had to face the insidious impact of spies’. Matisonn 
(2015:200) reveals how a long-time spy-journalist, Gordon Winter, 
was embedded in several newsrooms by his editor, first at the 
Sunday Express and then later at The Citizen. Winter was one of 
the 37 South African journalists on the payroll of the then Bureau of 
State Security, commonly known as BOSS. They included three 
parliamentary correspondents, eight who worked on news desks 
and one editor-in-chief. The latter was in fact Sunday Times editor- 
in-chief, Tertius Myburgh. Matisonn reveals that Myburgh was kept 
in the newsroom and in exchange for his co-operation received 
secret information.
9
define the role of the media, the point of departure will be to look at 
its role in a global context. Internationally, the media wield 
tremendous power as purveyors of vital information (Merrill, 
1995:xiv). This is one of the reasons why the media are often 
referred to as the fourth branch of government, because of the 
power they wield and the oversight function they fulfil.
In Africa, the press served as a critical force in mobilising the 
indigenous population against colonial rule (Arnold de Beer, Francis 
Kasoma, Eronini Megwa, and Elanie Steyn in Merrill (1995:214)). To 
unpack this, resonance can be found in McNair's (1999:1) writing, 
which argues that the media are important because ‘a mature 
democracy depends on having an educated electorate, informed 
and connected through Parliament’. In his close examination of the 
role of the media in a democratic society, White (2008) concludes 
that they provide access to knowledge of government activities. He 
further states that in Africa the use of the media is the single most 
important factor in active and knowledgeable participation in 
democratic governance (White, 2008).
White’s argument is supported by McNair’s (1999:1) assertion that 
the media are important because a mature democracy depends on 
having an educated electorate, informed and connected through 
Parliament. In fact, it is principally through the media that such an 
electorate can be established. According to White (2008), the 
classical role of the media in the democratic process is to act as an 
independent “trustee” of the public and to continually monitor and 
evaluate whether the government is implementing legislation and 
providing the services that this legislation implies.
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They are:
• 1902-03: John D. Rockefeller and the Standard Oil Company
• 1906: Upton Sinclair exposes conditions in Chicago’s
meatpacking plants
• 1953: Murrey Marder dogs Sen. Joseph McCarthy’s witch hunt
• 1962-64: David Halberstam calls foul on the US military’s rosy 
Vietnam claims
• 1969: Seymour Hersh exposes the My Lai massacre and cover- 
up
• 1971: The Pentagon Papers are leaked and published
• 1972: Woodward and Bernstein expose the Watergate break-in
• 1992: Florence Graves reveals sexual misconduct in Congress
• 2010: Dana Priest and William Arkin detail secret government 
organisations
• 2013: The Washington Post and The Guardian report on NSA 
surveillance
Likewise, South Africa has had its fair share of scandals and, had it 
not been for the relentless effort by newspaper houses to hold those 
in power accountable, these scandals would have remained buried. 
Like the US media, South Africa’s history is not short of iconic 
moments, as its tradition of investigative journalism is well- 
established. Some of the remarkable examples of investigative 
journalism moments date back to the infamous Information Scandal, 
but recent-times scandals are plentiful (Harber, 2015).
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Table 1: Some of the stories that broke in recent times 
(concluded)
S to ry D e s c r ip tio n P u b lic a tio n
The Nkandla 
Files
When the Mail & Guardian broke the story of the 
construction work being done at newly elected 
President Jacob Zuma’s residence near 
Nkandla in KwaZulu-Natal in 2009, no one could 
have predicted that it would turn into a saga that 
would drag on for years.
Mail & 
Guardian
Oilgate 1 & 2 The first leg of the scandal involves PetroSA's 
acquisition of Sabre Oil & Gas, a British Virgin 
Islands company that owns oil-producing and 
exploration acreage off the coast of Ghana. The 
second leg of the scandal involves PetroSA's 
firing of global investment bank HSBC as 
transaction advisers on "Project Irene", the 
secretive negotiations to acquire Engen's petrol 
stations for about R14 billion.
Mail & 
Guardian
Eskom Scandal The blackout emergency, which cost South 
Africa an estimated R300 billion, was 
engineered to benefit favoured companies. The 
Eskom manager who was given the job of 
buying more than R10 billion of emergency coal 
during the 2008 power crisis negotiated several 
"irregular" contracts -  including one with a friend 
-  and resigned shortly after an investigation was 
launched.
Business Day 
and Sunday 
Times
The
GuptaLeaks: 
The Captured 
Presidency
Investigations show that the Guptas zeroed in 
on some of the nation’s most sensitively placed 
staff, including the head of the Presidential 
Protection Service, as well as Zuma’s chief of 
staff, his private secretary and a chief director in 
the deputy president’s office. In certain 
instances some of these officials appear to have 
returned favours, potentially subverting their 
positions in the Union Buildings for the Guptas’ 
benefit.
The Daily 
Maverick
The Prasa Train 
Scandal
Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa receives 
new diesel locomotives that are too high for the 
long distance routes they were intended for. The 
thirteen Afro 4000 diesel locomotives that have 
so far been delivered to Prasa are worth R600 
million and form part of a larger R3.5 billion 
order for 70 new locomotives. The locomotives 
have a roof height of 4 264mm while the 
maximum height for diesel locomotives may not 
exceed 3 965mm, according to senior rail 
engineers with first-hand knowledge of the saga.
Rapport
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cannot be understated and is in the frontline of the battle to maintain 
democracy. Yeoh (2011) further argues that the function of the 
press is, among other things, to report corruption, dishonesty and 
graft wherever it may occur, and to expose the perpetrators. The 
press must reveal dishonesty and inept administration and act as 
the watchdog of those governed. In line with Yeoh’s analysis, 
Duncan (2014:197) takes it a step further by explaining the features 
of investigative journalism, namely “digging deeply into an issue of 
public interest, focusing not only on events but on the underlying 
process...and providing new information from multiple sources”.
To further demonstrate the power and impact of investigative 
journalism, two scandals -  the Watergate Scandal in the United 
States of America and Muldergate in South Africa -  saw President 
Richard Nixon and Prime Minister of South Africa, Balthazar 
Johannes Vorster, leave office respectively after the scandals 
emerged. Herbst (2013) quotes Allister Sparks in a column, 
Serialised Scandal that appeared in The Natal Witness:
“Think back to the great ‘Information Scandal’ Muldergate. A
puny affair in moral and monetary terms compared with the Arms
Deal, but it brought down the Vorster government.”
“With impeachment proceedings against him having commenced,” 
writes Swaine (2008), “Nixon resigned on August 8, 1974, telling the 
US people in a televised address: To leave office before my term is 
completed is abhorrent to every instinct in my body. But as 
President, I must put the interests of America first’."
Both Prime Minister Vorster (later President 1978-79) and President 
Nixon resigned from presidency due to the scandals unearthed by 
investigative reporters.
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1.7 Scope
The focus of this study is investigative journalism as initiated in 
South Africa. The findings are pertinent not only to South Africa but 
to other countries across the continent, as investigative journalists 
are facing similar challenges and share similar hardships and 
traditions (Gearing, 2016:16).
In analysing the data, this research seeks to underscore problem 
areas facing investigative journalists, such as:
• the signing of bills that will discourage the whistleblowing 
tradition;
• using laws and legislation to enable mass surveillance on 
citizenry;
• state disinformation campaigns;
• intimidation and harassment of whistleblowers;
• using state security to suppress information; and
• silencing critical voices (media) and denying the media its 
freedoms.
1.8 Research question and sub-questions
1.8.1 Research question
How do perceptions of surveillance affect investigative journalism?
1.8.2 Sub-questions
The specific research questions that will be undertaken are as 
follows:
• How do they know that they are being spied on and how do these 
perceptions affect how news is gathered?
• How do these perceptions affect how stories are written?
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CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Introduction
This chapter presents relevant literature that was reviewed in 
relation to the study. This was done by organising the discussion 
around the following five themes that emerged from the literature:
• Investigative journalism
• Freedom of expression and press
• The Protection of State Information Bill (the Secrecy Billj
• Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of 
Communication-related Information Act
• The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill
• State surveillance
Even though the literature presents these themes in a variety of 
contexts, this review focuses primarily on their application and how 
they enable authorities to easily spy on journalists. The discussion 
puts into focus the continuing debate on the State’s attempts to 
monitor (new) media.
2.2 Defining investigative journalism
The Global Investigative Journalism Network defines investigative 
journalism as systematic, in-depth, and original research and 
reporting, often involving the unearthing of secrets. This is in spite of 
varying definitions of this form of journalism. Mark Lee Hunter and 
Nils Hanson (Hanson et al., 2011:8) state:
“It involves exposing to the public matters that are concealed -  
either deliberately by someone in a position of power, or 
accidentally, behind a chaotic mass of facts and circumstances 
that obscure understanding. It requires using both secret and 
open sources and documents.”
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systematic, in-depth, and original research and reporting, often 
involving the unearthing of secrets. Others note that its practice 
often involves heavy use of public records and data, with a focus on 
social justice and accountability.
2.3 Freedom of expression and freedom of the press
According to Kent Sidel and Aralynn McMane in Merrill (1995:146), 
the essence of freedom is a historic balance between two 
competing protections. The press is protected from State 
interference in the forms of censorship or restrictive licensing. In the 
South African context, protecting the freedom of the press is 
enshrined in the Bill of Rights -  a cornerstone of South Africa’s 
democracy. Section 16 of the Constitution states that: “Everyone 
has the right to freedom of expression which includes, among, 
others -
a. Freedom of the press and other media
b. Freedom to receive and impart information or ideas. ”
Freedoms of expression and of the press are protected in the 
Constitution and generally respected in practice. However, several 
apartheid-era laws and a 2004 Law on Antiterrorism were used by 
authorities to restrict reporting on the security forces, prisons, and 
any sites or institutions deemed by authorities to be important to the 
‘national interest’. One such law, the National Key Points Act of 
1980, prevents journalists from accessing or photographing areas 
deemed of interest to national security. In recent years, there has 
been an increase in the number of locations designated under the 
Act. Journalists and media outlets at times face the threat of legal 
action as a result of their work, particularly when reporting on 
prominent political or business figures (Freedom House, 2016).
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South Africa, freedom of the press is under threat and its possible 
censure the subject of public protest. In its endeavour to muzzle a 
free press, as well as to restrict the right of access to information, 
the present government shows no sign of abandoning its proposed 
Protection of Information Bill.”
Cwele (Department of State Security, 2010) further noted that the 
Bill seeks to incorporate the rights and responsibilities guaranteed 
by the Constitution. This process is guided by the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that provides the following 
under article 19(2): “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and 
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, 
either orally, in writing or in print.”
Section 14 of the Bill of Rights guarantees for everyone “the right to 
privacy which includes, among others, the right not to have the 
privacy of their communications infringed”. The 2016 Freedom on 
the Net report, Silencing the Messenger: Communication Apps 
Under Pressure, criticises the introduction of a draft Cybercrimes 
and Cybersecurity Bill by South Africa’s Department of Justice. 
While recognising the need for updated cybersecurity legislation, the 
advocates of media freedom criticised numerous aspects of the bill, 
which would broadly prohibit the dissemination of speech that 
promotes hate, discrimination, or violence; permit the seizure of 
computers and digital information without a court order; and 
criminalise the possession or dissemination of classified information 
-  drawing comparisons to the Protection of State Information Bill or 
POSIB as it is known. This bill has not been passed (Freedom 
House, 2016).
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In drawing parallels, Church (2011:36) highlights the earlier 
Watergate scandal in the early seventies in the United States and 
the much earlier clash between Lord Charles Somerset and Messrs 
Pringle and Fairbairn during the early British rule at the Cape. All of 
these highlight the necessity of a free press and the importance of 
upholding of the rule of law (Church, 2011:36).
In its oral and written submission to the ad hoc Committee on the 
Protection of State Information Bill (National Council of Provinces), 
the Legal Resource Centre’s Constitutional Litigation Unit, argued 
that while there is general agreement that there is a need to replace 
the Protection of Information Act No. 84 of 1982, the Bill does not 
correctly balance the principles of protecting classified State 
information against the equally important principles of openness, 
transparency, accountability and the rule of law (Bizos & Kerfoot, 
2012).
The current draft of the POSIB, which would criminalise certain 
types of disclosures, includes national security and foreign relations, 
but also commercially sensitive information and privacy, within the 
scope of the system of classification. POSIB is still being debated in 
South Africa (Mendel, 2013).
2.4 Regulation of Interception of Communications and
Provision of Communication-related Information Act (RICA)
The so-called RICA Act (Act 70 of 2002) (RICA) came into effect on 
1 July 2011 (Polity, 2013). Polity (2013) suggests that RICA became 
law because of the rise in organised criminal activities attributed to 
sophisticated communication technology such as mobile 
telephones, satellite communications, email and other computer- 
related communications. As a rule, RICA prohibits the interception 
and monitoring of direct and indirect communications. However, 
South Africa’s first post-apartheid movement that centred on
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more laborious process of applying for a direction”. One case comes 
to mind, the case of the Sunday Times journalist Mzilikazi wa Afrika, 
as probably one of many cases where law enforcement services 
short-circuited the process to obtain a lawful interception direction 
and intercept the journalist’s communication.
On the other hand, evidence is mounting that the State has been 
using surveillance to target investigative journalists, political activists 
and unionists, and to interfere in South Africa’s politics and public 
life (ibid, 2016).
Frank La Rue, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom 
of Expression and Opinion, writes (2013:10):
“States have access to a number of different techniques and 
technologies to conduct communications surveillance of a 
targeted individual’s private communications. Real-time 
interception capabilities allow States to listen to and record 
the phone calls of any individual using a fixed line or mobile 
telephone, using interception capabilities for State 
surveillance that all communications networks are required to 
build into their systems.”
He further states that, “the right to privacy is often understood as an 
essential requirement for the realisation of the right to freedom of 
expression. Undue interference with individuals’ privacy can both 
directly and indirectly limit the free development and exchange of 
ideas. An infringement upon one right can be both the cause and 
consequence of an infringement upon the other” (La Rue, 2013:12).
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2.6 How do these affect media freedom?
Rodriguez (2013) points out that communications surveillance 
should be regarded as a highly intrusive act that potentially 
interferes with the rights to freedom of expression and privacy and 
threatens the foundations of a democratic society. One extreme of 
surveillance is that of altering behaviour. Parramore (2013) 
observes that there are serious psychological consequences to 
being surveilled and one of those is “changing us, both as a society 
and as individuals, by throwing us off balance, heightening some 
characteristics and inhibiting others, and tailoring our behaviour 
sometimes to show what the watcher wants to see. It is intrusive 
and disempowering”.
Some scholars have observed that the problem with surveillance is 
that people behave differently when they feel they are being 
watched. So, as a result, this perception has a sense of 
undermining the role that investigative journalism plays in securing 
democracy. York (2013) argues that “mass surveillance without due 
process threatens to stifle and smother dissent, keeping a populace 
cowed by fear”.
York (2013) further states that extensive research on the 
psychological effects of such widespread surveillance has shown 
subjects to be self-conscious and fearful. The long-term damage 
attributable to such apprehension manifests in a variety of ways 
such the creation of a culture of self-censorship’. UNESCO 
(2014:13) argues that, increasingly, reporters are victimised for 
making vital information public when it embarrasses their 
government. In the last years, the International Federation of 
Journalists (IFJ) has had to intervene to protest over actions where 
governments have been caught spying on their journalists or 
applying undue pressure.
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Although investigations can have a tremendous impact, journalists 
run great risks. One means of combating perils such as physical 
violence is to take a step that compromises the journalist’s 
professional and individual freedom, namely self-censorship, which 
can be much worse than government censorship (UNESCO, 
2014:53). Self-censorship was a great factor in the apartheid 
government’s campaign to suppress the free flow of information.
Kessel (2012:74) points out that the dark spectre of bills, such as 
the Secrecy Bill, which threatens stiff penalties for the unauthorised 
exposure of State secrets may not only threaten the work of 
courageous reporters, but could also be harmful to [South Africa’s] 
young democracy.
2.7 Spying in apartheid South Africa
Veteran South African journalist, John Matisonn argues in his book, 
God, Spies and Lies, that one of the best journalists and editors in 
South Africa at the time of the events he writes about was actually a 
government spy. Due to its chequered past, South Africa has a long 
history of state spying on journalists (Carter, 2015). Matisonn 
(2015:127) states: ‘We now know the security police had bugs in the 
editor’s flowerpot’. Matisonn (2015:168) recounts that ‘[Dr Eschel] 
Rhoodie, then Secretary of Information in the National Party 
Government, was receiving transcripts of journalists’ bugged 
telephone calls. Rhoodie boasted that the phones of all the political 
correspondents of the opposition press were tapped. He’s read all 
our conversations’.
Former police agent, John Horak, testified at the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that “half the newsrooms of South 
Africa's newspapers were populated by informers working for the 
old South African government. He named almost every newspaper
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Duncan (2014:224) refers to the case involving the above two 
journalists and suggests the bugging of their phones was confirmed 
by a Pietermaritzburg magistrate, who stated that the KwaZulu- 
Natal provincial crime intelligence chief had sent him as an emissary 
to apologise for the bugging. Duncan writes that the two journalists 
had their communications intercepted in order to disrupt their work 
as journalists and uncover their sources.
In an interview with Amy Goodman, legendary South African editor, 
Allister Spark (Goodman, 2006) narrates how police wiretapped 
their offices to eavesdrop on him and his staff at the then Rand 
Daily Mail. Sparks (in Goodman (2006)) lamented, “...wiretapping 
was pervasive in South Africa.” Deceptively, the South African 
police also planted spies in the newsrooms, especially those seen 
as sympathetic to the struggle or the so-called liberal press. “I then 
discovered that my own secretary was a spy.”
A report titled US: Surveillance Harming Journalism, Law, 
Democracy (2014) suggests that journalists are struggling harder 
than ever before to protect their sources, and sources are more 
reluctant to speak because the government is monitoring both the 
journalists and sources. This environment makes reporting both 
slower and less fruitful.
2.8 Disinformation, misinformation and targeting of 
whistleblowers
• Disinformation and misinformation
The efforts to control information sometimes involve the 
dissemination of misinformation and/or disinformation. This is a 
proactive tactic often used by state security to discredit media and
35
According to Du Preez the aim of dezinformatsiya was to disrupt 
and discredit opponents, and to deceive, obscure and influence 
public opinion. In the wake of the SARS debacle, he warned 
journalists and editors to brace and prepare themselves for a whole 
lot of dezinformatsiya in South Africa over the coming weeks and 
months (Du Preez, 2016).
Scholars Tomaselli and Louw (1991:126) make reference to the 
then South African Defence Force’s disinformation and 
misinformation campaign of “Winning Hearts and Minds”. Once the 
principle of the link between violent and peaceful means was drawn, 
justification was provided for declaring nonviolent political groups 
and opposition media the enemy, and for attacking them (Tomaselli 
& Louw, 1991:126).
• Targeting of whistleblowers
According to Kevin Malunga (2015:6), whistleblowing is the 
disclosure by current or former members of an organisation of 
immoral, illegitimate or illegal practices under the control of the 
employers, to organisations or persons that might be able to effect 
action. It can also be defined as the disclosure by an employee of 
confidential information relating to some danger, fraud or other 
illegal or unethical conduct connected with the workplace, be that of 
the employer or of his fellow employees (Malunga, 2015). It is this 
act of whistleblowing that saw the Helen Suzman Foundation (HSF) 
offices in Parktown, Johannesburg being the target of a military- 
style raid during the course of 2016. Those conducting the raid 
clearly knew what they were looking for, as computers and other 
documentation relating to the programmatic work of the HSF were 
taken (TMG, 2016). News reports suggested at the time “the 
brazen, co-ordinated nature of the operation and its targeted, 
selective focus are sinister”. The HSF has been at the forefront of
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who came to prominence in June 2013 when he released numerous 
highly classified NSA documents to various media organisations 
(Currie & McIntyre, 2016:1). He has since suffered serious 
consequences because he released the NSA documents, and has 
been charged with several criminal offences by his government as a 
result of his illegal actions. The first revelation from the Snowden 
documents provided insight into the NSA’s collection of domestic 
email and telephone metadata from Verizon. The confidential court 
order, which was leaked by Snowden, requires Verizon to transfer 
customer information to the NSA on a daily basis.
Another significant disclosure as a result of the Snowden 
documents was the programme Prism, a surveillance programme 
that was launched in 2007 by the NSA. Prism collects the private 
information of internet accounts directly from the servers of nine 
flagship US internet companies, such as Microsoft, Google, and 
Facebook (Currie & McIntyre, 2016:4).
Snowden’s actions to release the classified NSA documents were 
morally right, as the leak clearly identifies evidence of public 
wrongdoing and his actions embody honourable moral principles 
such as honesty, justice, freedom, and fidelity to the American 
people. The surveillance programmes have been plagued by 
compliance issues, and the legal arguments justifying the 
surveillance regime have been kept from view (Lizza 2013).
There is also the case of Julian Assange, the founder of the 
infamous WikiLeaks, which published confidential documents in 
2010. WikiLeaks is a non-profit, whistleblowing organisation and 
website that publishes materials provided by anonymous sources. 
WikiLeaks has been responsible for a wide range of information 
leaks about many countries and corporations. In his own defence,
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people working in government, as, according to Yende, the 
provincial government is characterised by a climate of fear. De Waal 
(2011) cites Sama Yende:
“People in government come across corruption every day, 
but they are so scared to speak about it. It is not easy to get 
people to speak about corruption because they fear for their 
lives. There are stories of assassination and everyone you 
speak to believe their organisation is under surveillance”.
2.9 The psychological effect of surveillance
Merriam-Webster defines surveillance as follows;
Surveillance
noun sur-veil-lance \sar- va-len(t)s also - val-yen(t)s or - va- 
en(t)s\
: close watch kept over someone or something
Parramore (2013) suggests that researchers have long known that 
there are serious psychological consequences to being surveilled, 
both as a society and as individuals. She argues that being watched 
or surveilled sometimes tailors behaviour to show what the watcher 
wants to see, and other times to actively rebel against a condition 
that feels intrusive and disempowering. This view is supported by 
Goldman (2014) who argues that humans care a great deal about 
being watched. Goldman explains that people change their 
behaviour and “that applies even when we’re under the gaze of a 
pair of eyes on a poster”. Similarly, surveillance is as much about 
perception as it is about power.
Being watched affects behaviour and emotions (Gonzalez, 2011; 
MacKenzie, 2006) as eyes are known to be a powerful perceptual 
signal for humans. People behave more cooperatively when they 
are being “watched”.
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surveillance. Accordingly, they regulate their own behaviour despite 
their ignorance as to whether they actually are under surveillance at 
any particular time (Gill & Phythian, 2006).
South Africa’s respected clinical psychologist and former section 
head of the South African Police Service’s Specialised Investigative 
Psychology section, Professor Gerard Labuschagne, confirmed that 
surveillance indeed changes one’s behaviour.
Labuschagne makes the case:
“If you are referring to surveillance by government agencies 
then we run the risk of becoming like North Korea, or old East 
Block countries, and that can create a lot of paranoia in a 
population and mistrust of others.”
(The researcher interviewed Prof. Labuschagne via email on 24 
August 2017.)
Academics agree that the topic of surveillance needs to find its 
place in everyday conversations. On the positive side, as observed 
by Golbeck (2016), surveillance has some clear benefits, such as 
helping authorities detect crime. This argument is centred on the 
growing concern of terror threats worldwide. The better the 
surveillance, the more likely it is that moral transgressions will be 
detected and punished. Knowing this, people are less inclined to 
break the rules, and over time they form ingrained rule-abiding 
habits (Westacott, 2010). On the negative side, however, 
commentators argue that the effectiveness of surveillance for 
preventing crime or terrorism can be debated, but if the goal is to 
control a population, mass surveillance is frightening (Shaw 2017).
Moreover, Westacott (2010) and Shaw (2017) raise a good point 
about surveillance altering behaviour and controlling the population.
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Heightening surveillance in the workplace might be associated with 
two costs in particular. Work conducted under surveillance is 
motivated by the avoidance of punishment, rather than by goals 
shared with those in power (Stanton & Julian, 2002; Whitty, 2004). 
Surveillance involves the gathering and storing of information, as 
well as the supervision of behaviour. It can constrain the exercise of 
civil liberties. The monitoring and labelling of dissent is seen as a 
prerequisite for strategies to hinder civil society activities through 
ridicule, stigma or silencing (Lubbers 2015). In the context of this 
research, it is evident that behaviour does change when subjects 
know, or suspect, that they might be under gaze.
Labuschagne is of the view that if government-sponsored 
surveillance becomes the norm, it can have an indirect impact on a 
person’s mental health, which can in turn affect a person’s physical 
health. If it leads to paranoia, then it can affect relationships and 
families because people start to suspect that friends and family can 
report them to the state (Labuschagne, 2017).
2.10 The state’s right to spy
In the contemporary international system, states are the principal 
customers of intelligence and the key organisers of collection and 
analysis agencies (Gill & Phythian, 2006:01). However, a range of 
sub-state actors -  commercial, non-commercial and criminal -  also 
have a need to collect and analyse intelligence and guard against 
the theft of their own secrets. This, according to Gill and Phythian 
(2006:39), is hardly surprising -  given the state centrism of 
international relations and, with respect to internal security, the 
central concern with the impact of state surveillance on citizens’ 
rights and liberties. At the domestic level, intelligence may help save 
lives; internationally, it can provide or be used to provide the basis 
for decisions to go to war, and hence cost lives (Gill & Phythian,
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CHAPTER THREE -  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
3.1 Introduction
The literature review in Chapter 2 provided a broad overview of 
existing research as an introductory phase of this study aimed at 
investigating how perceptions of surveillance affect investigative 
journalism.
Chapter 3 presents an in-depth description of the design used to 
study the respondents’ perceptions of surveillance and its impact on 
investigative journalists. This chapter also details the design of the 
study by reporting on the processes that were used to locate and 
interview participants.
Qualitative research was selected to conduct this study, as this 
approach is primarily exploratory in nature and serves to gain an 
understanding of underlying reasons, opinions and motivations. 
Qualitative research is also used to uncover trends in thought and 
opinions, and dive deeper into the problem (Wyse, 2011).
Patton (1985) suggests that qualitative, interpretive research is 
useful for describing and answering questions about participants 
and contexts. He further explains that qualitative research can 
answer questions and illuminate issues that cannot be addressed by 
quantitative methods.
Qualitative research is an effort to understand situations in their 
uniqueness as part of a particular context and the interactions there 
(Patton, 1985). This type of research builds abstractions, concepts, 
hypotheses or theories, rather than to test existing theory. Typically, 
qualitative findings are in the form of themes, categories, concepts 
or tentative hypotheses or theories. The product of a qualitative
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collection and analysis of data in a manner that aims to combine 
relevance to the research purpose with economy in procedure”.
3.3 Purposeful sampling
For research purposes, this study focused on investigative 
journalists. However, to protect them, the selected journalists could 
not be identified by name. The researcher chose these journalists 
based on the nature of investigative projects they worked on, and 
continue to work on, for their respective publications. The journalists 
write for the Mail & Guardian, AmaBhungane, The Daily Dispatch, 
Sunday Times, and City Press.
3.4 Purposive sampling
Purposive sampling is an acceptable kind of sampling for special 
situations (Neuman, 2013:203). It uses the judgement of an expert 
to select cases, or it selects cases with a specific purpose in mind. 
With purposive sampling, the researcher never knows whether the 
case selected represents the population (Neuman in Du Plooy- 
Cilliers et al (2013:204). Pascoe in Du Plooy-Cilliers et al (2014:137) 
concurs with Neuman that non-probability sampling is used when it 
is nearly impossible to determine who the entire population is or 
when it is difficult to gain access to the entire population. Non­
probability sampling, according to Pascoe in Du Plooy-Cilliers et al 
(2014:137) can be used when researchers want to draw a sample
• that is in line with the parameters (shared characteristics) of the 
research;
• where not all individuals or social artefacts in the population are 
easy to access or are known; and/or
• where drawing a representative sample to generalise results to a 
broader population is not the goal of the study.
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3.7 Profile of investigative journalists
J o u rn a lis t P u b lic a tio n Y e a rs  o f  
e x p e r ie n c e
G e n d e r
AA City Press More than 10 
years
Male
AB Sunday Times More than 10 
years
Male
AC Sunday Times Less than 10 
years
Male
AD M ail & Guardian Unknown Female
AE Am aBhungane Less than 10 
years
Female
AF The D aily D ispatch Less than 10 
years
Male
AG Freelancer Unknown Male
AH City Press Less than 10 
years
Male
3.8 Publication profiles 
•  City Press
The City Press is a South African English-language Sunday 
newspaper, published in Johannesburg, Gauteng. It is aimed at 
black readers and is the country’s third-biggest-selling newspaper. 
James R.A. Bailey and the South African Associated Newspapers 
(SAAN) group established the newspaper in 1982 as the Golden 
City Press (www.news24.com).
51
3.9 Reliability and validity
Kumar (2011:178) defines validity as the ability of an instrument to 
measure what it is designed to measure; therefore, validity is 
defined as “the degree to which the researcher has measured what 
he has set out to measure”. Kumar (2011:181) also defines 
reliability as a degree of accuracy or precision in the measurement 
made by a research instrument. Du Plooy-Cilliers, Davis and 
Bezuidenhout (2014:253) believe that reliability and validity in 
research are much like the way in which human beings develop 
feelings of trust in certain people. Kumar (2011:179) furthermore 
observes that these two approaches are based on either logic that 
underpins the construction of the research tool, or statistical 
evidence that is gathered by using information generated by means 
of the instrument. Establishing validity through logic implies the 
justification of each question in relation to the objectives of the 
study.
It is worth noting that these two concepts, reliability and validity, are 
employed very commonly in quantitative research, as they relate to 
the measurability of results. Du Plooy-Cilliers et al. (2014:253) state 
that “this does not mean that qualitative researchers do not deem 
validity and reliability important; they just use different terminology to 
describe the same idea”.
During the course of data gathering, participants freely shared 
information and their experiences. Most of them described the study 
as ‘long overdue’.
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The study in hand employed open-ended questions to encourage 
respondents to elaborate on their experiences.
3.11 Data analysis
3.11.1 Qualitative content analysis
Strydom and Bezuidenhout in Du Plooy-Cilliers et al. (2014:191) 
define qualitative content analysis as a research method for the 
subjective interpretation of text data through a systematic 
classification process of coding and identifying themes or patterns. 
Qualitative content analysis involves the systematic analysis of 
social artefacts to provide an in-depth understanding of, for 
example, media texts and their specific contexts. In performing a 
qualitative content analysis, the researcher works in an interpretive 
paradigm with the goal of providing a thick description of the social 
reality mirrored in texts (Du Plooy-Cilliers et al., 2014:191).
3.12 Data presentation
Du Plooy-Cilliers et al. (2014:249) advise researchers to keep in 
mind that qualitative research is fundamentally interpretive and that 
the interpretation represents the researcher’s personal and 
theoretical understanding of the phenomenon under study. 
Researchers therefore need to organise information throughout the 
presentation in terms of the themes and categories that were used 
for analysis and interpretation.
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3.15 Structure of the dissertation
The dissertation was structured as follows:
Chapter 1 - Introduction
Chapter 2 -  Literature review
Chapter 3 -  Research methodology
Chapter 4 -  Data analysis, findings and conclusion
57
and monitoring of journalists carried out by the State was illegal, and 
created a climate of fear among journalists.
The second section focuses on how the State used dirty tricks to 
intimidate journalists in a bid to stifle investigations into state 
corruption -  which often involved senior public officials. It emerged 
from the study that the State also used dirty tricks to either 
misinform or push a certain dialogue into the public domain. Other 
common means of dirty tricks used by the State ranged from 
discrediting journalists to leaking stories and planting fake stories.
The third section focuses on how interviewees resorted to self- 
censoring to protect themselves and their sources from scrutiny by 
state security. The study revealed a problematic situation in that it 
mirrored an environment where fear rules. The fourth section 
discusses how journalists, despite state interference, were resolute 
in their quest to unearth and disclose corruption in the public sector. 
The findings suggest that journalists resorted to using sophisticated 
methods to counter the prying of state security agents. The last 
section presents opinions of the participants on their perception of 
spying and its impact on investigative journalism in South Africa.
4.2 Themes
4.2.1 Theme 1: Journalists’ perception of surveillance
From the journalists’ perspective, the fear of being spied on by the 
State is best described by Daily Maverick journalist, Mandy Weiner 
(2013), when she wrote that “when you greet on the phone you 
must greet Richard Mdluli also”. Weiner claimed that Mdluli, the 
former head of the SAPS’s Crime Intelligence Division, was the 
bogeyman who personified everything perceived to be bad and 
corrupt about the country and the police service.
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He further suggested that “any monitoring that infringes the rights of 
any person must be done with a court order, and be in line with the 
Monitoring and Interception Act and other legislation”.
The study revealed that the journalists claimed they had been 
harassed by the State and their phones had been wiretapped. The 
reactions of investigative journalists to surveillance by the State 
seemed to be symptomatic of a wider tendency. Most of the 
journalists interviewed for this study believed that their 
conversations were being listened to. As for electronic 
communications surveillance, the respondents were not sure if and 
when it happened, as it was difficult to prove. Regarding the 
bugging of their phones, they had reason to believe that their 
conversations were ‘sometimes’ being listened to, despite a lack of 
hard evidence to prove this. The truth is that wiretapping and other 
forms of message interception have been the common currency of 
espionage and intelligence services over many decades (Lyon, 
1994:4).
The eight respondents expressed and interpreted their suspicions 
and perceptions in a variety of ways, and most agreed that they 
might have been subjected to unjustified surveillance by the State. 
Nonetheless, some respondents admitted to having been oblivious 
of the State’s attempt to eavesdrop on them. One of the eight 
respondents in fact claimed not to have been affected by state 
surveillance at all, and no further explanation was given.
It was interesting to note that only one respondent out of the eight 
actually admitted to having been spied on and revealed the 
following:
Interviewee AB:
Yes I have been surveilled several times.
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These observations have one thing in common: although none of 
the respondents could prove that they had been spied upon, a clear 
pattern emerged -  that of mistrust between the respondents and the 
State. Interviewees appeared to have a firm view on the likelihood of 
being spied on, and as a result they were not letting their guard 
down. Similarly, despite a few known cases of being spied on, 
respondents seemed to suggest that the State was monitoring their 
phone conversations persistently. This is symptomatic of a State 
gravitating towards totalitarianism, a view reinforced by Lyon 
(1994:11). This fits in with the overall pattern observed, whereby 
respondents stated that they were largely conditioned by their 
specific personal experiences and those of other individuals, and by 
the immediate need to exercise extra caution when communicating 
with sources or (to some extent) with family and friends. The study 
showed that surveillance, which was once thought of as touching 
only the realm of political citizenship, was now affecting our 
involvement in society at a more basic level (Lyon, 1994:12).
4.2.2 Theme 2: Dirty tricks
Responses provided by the respondents during their interviews 
clearly demonstrated a concerted effort of meddling by officials 
(from government and state-owned companies) where there was a 
likelihood of corruption having taken place. This fits the overall 
pattern identified through data analysis that officials sometimes 
resorted to ‘dirty tricks’. Incidents the State has been accused of 
ranged from hiding information, and listening to and intercepting 
telephonic and other electronic conversations, to breaking into 
journalists’ homes to look for information pertaining to ongoing 
investigations and discrediting journalists through lifestyle audits.
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Interviewee AF:
Sometimes they [were] not responding to questions or they 
[would] withhold information and threatened me with a 
lawsuit.
Interviewee AH:
I have once reported on a matter involving the State Security 
Agency and a government official came to our offices and 
demanded that I hand over documents that were relevant to 
the article.
Only two respondents reported that they had not experienced any 
form of bullying by the State.
Those who have reportedly been intimidated said the situation had 
reached a stage where the media were seen as a threat, and 
attempts to bring it to heel and under control had not worked. As 
such, the media were being treated as a hostile opponent, and 
started to receive rhetoric around being some ‘dark’ entity 
comprising of agents and spies. The respondents felt that matter 
were getting to the stage where investigative journalists were seen 
as the enemy.
4.2.3 Theme 3: Spies embedded in newsrooms
Interviewees had the perception that spies had infiltrated 
newsrooms in South Africa. This inadvertently contributed to a 
climate of fear. Some interviewees felt that newsrooms were no 
longer a safe haven for journalists. However, two of the eight 
participants were not concerned and did not think this was the case, 
while the other six agreed that indeed there were spies in their 
midst.
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The respondents did not name the suspected spies whom they 
accused of infiltrating newsrooms, but at least were in agreement 
about the presence of such spies in their midst. Their varying 
assessments on spies in newsrooms had one thing in common: 
none doubted the occurrence and possibility of this happening. This 
had to a large degree changed their attitude towards state 
surveillance and raised the issue of trust among colleagues. Seeing 
that there was not complete trust within the newsrooms where these 
journalists worked, a silo mentality was encouraged in the 
workplace -  where people resisted sharing information with other 
people or departments.
4.2.4 Theme 4: Paranoid and helpless
Of the eight interviewed respondents, two said that they did not feel 
too vulnerable, as they were exercising extra care when gathering 
information from sources.
Interviewee AG:
Me being cautious means that I am constantly aware of the 
risks.
Interviewee AD:
I try my utmost not to think about these things too much, it can 
be severely crippling. My knee-jerk reaction therefore would be 
no, I never feel vulnerable. However, seeing that I'm very 
careful with my communication and how I gather information 
from sources, it is clear that I'm constantly aware of the risks.
Nonetheless, the majority of the interviewees indicated that they felt 
exposed. The findings from the interviews provided some insight on 
how journalists viewed their safety. Lyon (1994:218-219) warns 
against distrust and suggests that “paranoia produces paralysis.
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4.2.5 Theme 5: Journalists fight back
Participants recognised issues pertaining to information security as 
a serious concern -  primarily for all investigative journalists. The 
study confirmed this perception through observations arising from 
the interviews with participants. Participants stated that their 
employers had either promised or equipped them with necessary 
technical tools for their cell phones and laptops. In this case, 
technical tools referred to digital security software. However, 
participants were not forthcoming with information regarding such 
software and declined to answer the question. They simply said that 
it would give the spies some ideas.
Another participant added that, over and above technical tools, the 
key thing was the hands-on guidance and mentorship provided by 
their bosses. “Mentorship and guidance are crucial in investigative 
journalism and journalism in general,” said the participant, adding 
that the newspaper he worked for had a good legal budget to back 
investigative journalists. As far as technology is concerned; the 
participant stated there was almost an arms race between the spies 
and the journalists in terms of technology on a case-by-case basis 
on how to do research. “We invest in tools; kits and software,” said 
the participant.
Two of the participants, however, seemed worried about their digital 
security and concerned about their physical safety. One said when 
their lives were in danger, their employer would provide them with 
24-hour security, and this protection would extend to their families.
One participant stated that he always declined the personal 
protection, as he did not want to attract attention by going around 
with bodyguards.
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Interviewee AE:
When it is clear that even if the source is unnamed, it will be 
obvious he leaked the information because he is the only 
person who has it.
Interviewee AC:
When source-threat analysis confirms the risk, I omit the 
name(s) of the source(s).
Interviewee AE:
When I know so much more than I can write; for example, the 
State of Capture. I knew more than I could write and we 
could have blown up the investigation three/four years earlier. 
In the case of irrefutable evidence, we never self-censor; 
instead, we go big.
Interviewee AA:
I sometimes describe certain developments and/or people in 
particular ways so as to source people.
Interestingly, all the participants asserted that their editors, 
notwithstanding the heightened rhetoric from government and the 
intensity of snooping, had never censored them or encouraged self­
censorship. The respondents further remarked that journalists in the 
end only wrote about 20% of what they actually know. One 
participant went further by saying, “most of what I can't write is 
unprovable at the time of writing, or it is information known by only 
one source. I would rather try to confirm the information by means of 
a few other routes later on, but I will never put a source in a difficult 
situation”. Another respondent said: “The buck stops with me and I 
am the one who should tell my boss whether a story will 
compromise and expose a source.” A third participant was 
uncomfortable with the word “censor” when it came to editors,
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One of the participants also reported that when meeting a source 
who was perceived to be vulnerable, they made sure that their 
mobile phones were completely disabled several kilometres away 
from the meeting place. Another participant advised that the best 
way to communicate with sources was face-to-face meetings, and in 
hard-copy documents. Yet another participant said if face-to-face 
communication was impossible, they used secret Gmail accounts to 
which only the journalist and the source knew the password. 
“Protecting my sources is the first thing I do in my work,” said the 
participant. Apart from encrypted emails and other 
countermeasures, respondents agreed that the best time and place 
for meeting sources was after hours and at their homes.
Other participants suggested that sources should never be 
compromised, as these people actually risked their own lives. The 
participants advised that the first rule was to write in such a way that 
the story would not reveal who the source was.
Interviewee AB:
The golden rule of journalism is to protect your sources at all 
times, by any means necessary.
Interviewee AG:
Any journalist who is worth his salt is prepared to go to jail 
rather than reveal his or her source(s). Protecting a source is 
one of the fundamentals of journalism.
Interviewee AH:
We also go to great lengths to protect the identity of sources. 
This sometimes includes being deliberately vague when we 
describe or refer to these sources.
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journalists. As for the reason for spying on journalists, findings 
showed that the State was getting increasingly uncomfortable and 
agitated by reports that highlighted its corruption and inability to 
deliver on its promises. However, despite this, the journalists were 
determined to unravel what was happening inside the State and 
why citizens should know the truth.
Surprisingly, findings showed that surveillance, to some extent, 
helped journalists to be more responsible in their reporting, and to 
leave no room for errors. However, respondents were adamant that 
they were not giving spooks the credit for responsible journalism.
What also emerged strongly from the findings was that surveillance 
discouraged journalists from pursuing their investigations for fear of 
being harmed and bringing harm to their sources. In addition, 
evidence also suggested that many journalists applied self­
censorship as a way of protecting themselves.
On the legislation side, findings showed that there was a huge need 
for the government to tighten the weak legislation and oversight on 
intelligence with regard to state security. Findings also revealed that 
the State’s dragnet was concentrated on investigative journalists 
and the investigative units of those newspapers who published 
investigative journalism.
The study made it evident that investigative journalism plays a 
significant role in civil society. It is hoped that this research will 
contribute to an understanding of the extent to which the State spies 
on the media and shine some light on a long obstructed area with 
profound implications for the quality of journalism in South Africa.
Findings furthermore confirmed the State’s effort to criminalise a 
legitimate and legally recognised method of public accountability -
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APPENDIX C: Interview questions
1. Have you ever been surveilled by the State in the course of 
your work?
2. Has the State ever tried to tamper with an investigation of 
yours in any other way?
3. What sorts of methods do you believe the State employs to 
limit investigative journalists, other than surveillance?
4. Do you know of stories of how other journalists have been 
surveilled?
5. Why do you think the State is doing this?
6. Do you feel vulnerable professionally, personally or in any 
other way?
7. What practical measures do you take to prevent the State's 
interference in your work? Or do you take any practical 
measures to mitigate this sense of vulnerability (if it exists)?
8. Do you take any practical measures when writing up your 
investigation into a news story? (i.e. how you write it up to 
protect sources, yourself, etc.)
9. Have you ever self-censored a story to protect yourself or your 
sources?
10. Has an editor ever censored your story for the same reason?
11. Does the fact that you have a public profile help you to feel 
safer?
12. Does the newsroom offer you any form of protection or 
reassurance in your work? Whether in the form of resources, 
or through technical tools, or just support in any way?
13. How does state surveillance make you feel about the work you 
do?
14. How does it make you feel about the State/government?
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